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PROPOSED INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE
PROCEDURE
REGARDING
REVOCATION OF TAX
EXEMPT STATUS FOR
PRIVATE SCHOOLS
WHICH DISCRIMINATE
ON THE BASIS OF RACE*
DAVID L. ANDERSON
INTRODUCTION
On August 22, 1978, the Internal Revenue Service proposed revenue
procedures which would govern revocation of IRC section 501(c)(3) tax-
exempt status of private schools which discriminate on the basis of race.
In view of the large number of religious schools which could be potentially
affected by increased IRS scrutiny of racial policy in private education,
this issue warrants a thorough discussion giving particular attention to
First Amendment problems and possible abridgment of the constitutional
rights of religious educational institutions.
II. THE LEGAL BASIS OF IRS AUTHORITY TO DENY TAX EXEMPTION TO PRI-
VATE SCHOOLS WHICH DISCRIMINATE
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts organizations
"organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . .. or edu-
cational purposes." For more than fifty years after the establishment of the
Internal Revenue Service, favorable tax status was allowed to educational
institutions without regard to a school's particular racial, social, or philo-
sophical position. As a result of the constitutional doctrine permitting
separate but equal educational facilities, denial of tax benefits was never
* This is a version of an article which appears in Volume 55 of the Notre Dame Lawyer which
holds all copyright and reprint rights to such article.
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considered, either judicially or administratively. In 1954, however, the
"separate but equal" doctrine was overturned in Brown v. Board of
Education, I and racial discrimination in public education was ruled illegal
and contrary to public policy. In 1965, the IRS suspended rulings to private
schools while considering the question of the effect of racial discrimination
on their tax-exempt status. In 1967, it announced its position that racially
discriminatory private schools were not entitled to tax-exempt status, but
limited the ruling to those schools receiving state aid.2 Thus, prior to 1970,
the Internal Revenue Service continued to recognize as tax-exempt racially
discriminatory private schools which were not receiving state aid.
The IRS policy of non-intervention was first challenged in 1970 in
Green v. Kennedy.3 In this suit, black taxpayers in Mississippi and their
minor children alleged that exempt status was illegal and unconstitutional
to the extent that it supported the establishment and maintenance of
segregated private schools. In its decision, the district court found that a
substantial constitutional right was involved and that granting tax-exempt
status to an organization which discriminated against minorities frus-
trated the constitutional mandate of a unitary educational system by pro-
viding government support for a racially segregated dual school system.4
In response, the IRS issued two press releases stating that it would no
longer grant tax-exempt status to schools which maintained racially dis-
criminatory admissions policies.' The reasoning of the IRS was that all
organizations under section 501 and all contributions pursuant to IRC
section 170 had to first qualify as "charitable" under the common law.
Since federal policy is against racial discrimination, and all charities must
be in accord with federal public policy, private segregated schools cannot
qualify as a charity within the meaning of section 501.
Following the issuance of the IRS ruling, the District Court for the
District of Columbia convened a three judge panel to make permanent the
temporary injunction issued in Green v. Kennedy. In its deliberation, enti-
tled Green v. Connally, 6 the court set forth a declaratory decree, reasoning
that the changed position of the Service would not provide sufficient relief
for the plaintiffs, since its interpretation of the Code could change in the
future.' Relying on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the decisions of the Su-
preme Court banning racial segregation in public schools, and the post-
Civil War amendments to the Constitution, the court found that there was
a federal policy against government support for racial segregation of public
or private schools.' Thus, since the Code, as well as federal public policy,
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
IRS News Release, August 2, 1967, reprinted in [19671 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6734.
309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
309 F. Supp. at 1137.
IRS News Release, July 10, 1970, reprinted in [19701 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6790;
IRS News Release, July 19, 1970, reprinted in [19701 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6814.
330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
330 F. Supp. at 1170-72.
Id. at 1163-64.
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was opposed to support for racial segregation of schools, the court ruled
that the Code did not provide tax exemption for private schools that have
racially discriminatory policies,9 and permanently enjoined the service
from approving the exemption of any private school in Mississippi that
failed to make a specifically required showing in support of its exemption.I
As a result of Green and other case law striking down tax exemptions
for discriminatory private organizations" the IRS felt that it had a statu-
tory and constitutional basis to implement a nondiscrimination require-
ment. In 1971, Revenue Ruling 71-47712 was published. It explained the
nondiscrimination requirement, stating that a private school with a ra-
cially discriminatory policy as to students did not qualify for exemption.
In 1972, Revenue Procedure 72-5413 set forth guidelines for certain private
schools claiming tax exemption to publicize a racially nondiscriminatory
policy. Revenue Ruling 75-50,11 published in 1975, required all tax-exempt
private schools to adopt formally a nondiscrimination policy in their
charter, bylaws, or governing instrument, to refer to the policy in all bro-
chures and catalogs, and to publish notice of the policy annually by news-
paper or by use of the broadcast media. Schools were also required to
maintain records showing factors relevant to their racial composition.
Civil Rights groups and the Civil Rights Division of the Department
of Justice, however, questioned whether Revenue Procedure 75-50 enabled
the Service to determine whether a school had actually established a policy
of non-discrimination as required by the Green court. Even after the pro-
mulgation of Revenue Procedure 75-50, the IRS declared itself unable to
revoke the exemptions of private schools which have been specifically adju-
dicated by federal courts to be racially discriminatory as long as the
Id. at 1164.
10 Id. at 1170-71. The court avoided a direct ruling on the constitutional claim that the due
process clause of the fifth amendment prohibited the federal government from providing
financial support through tax benefits to institutions that discriminate on the basis of race.
The Code does not contemplate the granting of special federal tax benefits to trusts or
organizations, whether entitled to the special state rules relating to charitable trusts, whose
organization or operation contravene federal public policy. Id. at 1162. The court did note,
however, that all charitable trusts, educational or otherwise, must be legal and in compliance
with public policy. Id. at 1161.
1 In McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972), the court applied the nondiscri-
mination requirement beyond the educational context to other nonprofit organizations enti-
tled to tax benefits under the Code. The court sustained the constitutional challenge to
beneficial tax treatment for racially exclusive fraternal orders and found that the Government
had become sufficiently entwined with the private parties to ensure compliance with the fifth
amendment. Id. at 456-57. In its ruling the court considered the public nature of the activity,
the degree of regulatory control in determining the organization which may qualify for benefi-
cial tax treatment, and the aura of government approval in an IRS exemption ruling. Thus,
McGlotten struck down the deduction provisions for contributions both to nonprofit private
clubs and to fraternal organizations that discriminate on the basis of race.
* Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
'* Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834.
* Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587.
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schools published a pro forma statement of a contrary policy.'"
Nevertheless, in 1976 the Congress endorsed the rationale of the Green
decision by adding section 501(i) to the Internal Revenue Code. The sec-
tion denies exempt status to social clubs which "discriminat[e] against
any person on the basis of race, color, or religion."'" The Senate report
explaining the legislation indicated the Congressional understanding that
Green v. Connally remains the law for educational institutions tax exempt
under section 501(c)(3) and for the contributions of donors under section
170(c)(2).' 7
Another significant development was the publication of Revenue Rul-
ing 75-231,'1 which stated that private schools operated by churches, like
other private schools, shall not be tax exempt if they are racially discrimi-
natory. This enactment represented the IRS' complete acceptance of the
idea that the holding of Green, which mandates revocation of tax-exempt
status for any private school discriminating on the basis of race, extends
to religious schools. The permissibility of such an interpretation under the
Constitution, and the related question of the constitutionality of certain
provisions of the IRS procedures designed to carry it into effect, should be
next considered.
THE IRS REVENUE PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF AFFECTED
SCHOOLS
IRS Proposal Revenue Procedure
Before studying the perplexing constitutional issues, it is necessary to
survey the main provisions of the IRS Revenue Procedure governing revo-
cation of tax-exempt status. The original rules proposed by the Service
pursuant to the mandate of the Green line of cases divided private schools
into three classes: "adjudicated schools," "reviewable schools," and
"others."'" A "school adjudicated to be discriminatory" meant any private
, Since the publication of Rev. Proc. 75-50, the IRS has revoked the tax exemption of only
one private school. This school refused to adopt even a pro forma policy of nondiscrimination.
During this time the Service did not move against 20 schools which have been adjudicated
discriminatory which did adopt pro forma policies. Statement by Stuart E. Siegel, IRS Chief
Counsel, Tax Institute, Stonybrook, N.Y. (Oct. 21, 1978).
" I.R.C. § 501(i) (Supp. 1979).
" S. REP. No. 94-1318, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6051, 6058 n.5. In
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), the Supreme Court held that two privately owned
and operated schools, which received no public financial support, violated § 1 of the 1866 Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), when they refused to accept black students for admission.
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, enacted in accordance with the authority of Congress to legislate
under the thirteenth amendment, has been held to bar both public and private interference
with contractual rights. By applying the Civil Rights Act to private schools and finding that
parental rights to neither privacy nor free association supersede the bar against segregation
in public contracts, Runyon enunciated the strong public policy against racial discrimination
and reinforced the Green decision.
,8 Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158.
" 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (Aug. 22, 1978) (proposed § 3).
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school found to be discriminatory in a final court or administrative agency
decision. 0 A "reviewable" school was defined as any private school which,
though never adjudicated discriminatory, was formed or substantially ex-
panded at about the same time as desegregation was put into effect in the
public schools serving a particular community. Such expansion was said
to justify an inference of discrimination if the school did not have a mini-
mum percentage of minority students, which would be twenty percent of
the minority school age children in the community served by the school.
"Other school" meant a school "neither adjudicated to be discriminatory"
nor "reviewable." 21
For the "adjudicated" and "reviewable" schools, objective standards
were set forth which the schools had to meet to rebut the adjudication or
inference of discrimination.22 The basic standards to rebut the adjudica-
tion or inference were: (1) the presence in the school's student body of a
minimum number of minority students, or (2) the presence of four out of
five indices of good faith operation, i.e., significant financial aid to minor-
ity students, vigorous minority recruitment programs, an increasing per-
centage of minority students, employment of minority teachers, and "other
substantial evidence of good faith." 3 Even if four out of five indices were
met, however, the inference of discrimination would generally not be re-
butted if the school did not enroll any minority students.24
If the private school thus failed to rebut an adjudication or inference
of discrimination under the original proposed procedures, the Service
would revoke its tax exemption and suspend advance assurance of the
deductibility of contributions. The school could prevent this prompt revo-
cation, (but not the suspension of advanced assurance) by requesting a
grace period and agreeing to meet the standard within a reasonable period,
two school years or less. If the school failed to meet the standards during
the grace period, its tax exempt status would be retroactively revoked and
all contributions made since the suspension of advance assurance would
be denied deductibility.2 5
Following the publication of the proposed revenue procedure on Au-
gust 22, 1978, the Internal Revenue Service received over 100,000 letters
of public comment. After consideration of these comments, on February
9, 1979, the IRS issued a revised version of the proposed guidelines, in
which it more narrowly defined "adjudicated" and "reviewable" schools.
In addition, it substantially increased its discretion in determining
whether a private school has rebutted an inference or adjudication of racial
discrimination.2 6
Id. at 37,297 (proposed § 3.02).
SI Id. (proposed § 3.03).
" Id. at 37,297-8 (proposed § 4).
2 Id.
'A Id. at 37,298 (proposed §§ 4.01(2), .02(2)).
Id. (proposed § 5).
n 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451 (Feb. 13, 1979).
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The definition of reviewable schools is significantly narrowed by the
addition of a new third factor. To be reviewable, it must be a school where
formation or substantial expansion is "related in fact to public school
desegregation in the community."" The revised version of the rules goes
on to set forth seven examples of specific facts which would tend to indi-
cate the lack of a relationship in fact to school desegregation and seven
examples of facts which would support a relationship.8
The definition of "reviewable schools" is further narrowed by provid-
ing that a one-year increase in students of twenty percent or less (as com-
pared with ten percent previously) will not be considered "substantial
expansion"29 and by providing that the determination whether a school's
minority enrollment is insignificant will be based on all the relevant facts
and circumstances, with consideration given to special factors which limit
the school's ability to attract minority students. 31 An example of such a
factor would be an emphasis, for non-discriminatory purposes, on specific
programs or curricula which interest only groups not composed of signifi-
cant numbers of minority students, e.g., Hebrew or Amish schools.3 In
addition, the revised Procedure provides that where a school is part of a
large system of commonly supervised schools, and the particular school
does not meet the enrollment criteria, it may still be deemed to have met
the requirement if the minority enrollment throughout the system satisfies
the proposed numerical standard and if certain other standards are ful-
filled.32
While the time frame for determining whether the formation or sub-
stantial expansion of a school are suspect remain the same (one year before
and three years after desegregation),3 the revised version considers the
time of desegregation to be when substantial implementation of the rele-
vant desegregation order takes place.u This limits the duration of the
suspect desegregation period in comparison to the original version where
the period was to continue until three years after final implementation of
the desegregation plan.3 An additional technical change occurred in the
definition of the "community" served by the private school. The com-
munity remains the public school district in which the school is located,"
but includes additional districts only if the school enrolls at least twenty
percent 37 (as compared to five percent) of its students from them.
" Id. at 9,452 (proposed § 3.03).
2 Id. at 9,453 (proposed § 3.03(c)).
Id. (proposed § 3.03(a)).
Id. (proposed § 3.03(b)).
I3 d. (proposed § 3.03(c)(6)).
32 Id. (proposed § 3.03(b)).
3 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296, 37,297 (Aug. 22, 1978) (proposed § 3.03).
, 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,453 (Feb. 13, 1979) (proposed § 3.03(a)).
43 Fed. Reg. 37,296, 37,297 (Aug. 22, 1978) (proposed § 3.03).
31 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,453 (Feb. 13, 1979)(proposed § 3.04).
37 Id.
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Under both the original and revised revenue procedures, if a school is
classified as "adjudicated" or "reviewable," the burden of proof shifts, and
it is called upon to show it has taken actions or programs reasonably
designed to attract minority students on a continuing basis.18 Instead of
requiring a definite standard of four out of five indices of good faith," six
examples of actions which may contribute to attracting minority students
are listed and the level of action required can vary with circumstances of
the school depending upon its minority enrollment. Thus, under the re-
vised Procedure, the standards are much more flexible for rebutting an
adjudication or inference of discrimination.
Revocation of Tax-Exempt Status and the Establishment Clause
All branches of the government are constrained by the first amend-
ment's Establishment Clause. In Walz v. Tax Commission," for instance,
the Supreme Court held that the existence of religious exercise must be
permitted without sponsorship or interference. On first glance, it would
seem that the IRS guidelines affect an establishment of religion by giving
more favorable tax treatment to denominations which do not discriminate
than those whose beliefs require them to do so.
The Constitution does not speak directly to the question of the taxa-
tion of churches or the regulation of their conduct by the granting of a tax-
exempt status. Nor has the Supreme Court specifically ruled whether taxa-
tion of churches would violate the Constitution. However, the Court has
considered related questions in cases involving the first amendment estab-
lishment clause.
In Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist" and Lemon v.
Kurtzman," the Supreme Court summarized the elements necessary to
determine whether legislation is in conflict with the establishment clause.
The law must have a secular purpose, must not have the principal or
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and must not foster
excessive government entanglement with religion." The failure of any of
these tests may result in the statute or program being contary to the
establishment clause. In the analysis of the proposed guidelines under the
three-pronged test, the court must first find a legitimate secular purpose.
In the case of the IRS procedures, the purpose would be the federal public
policy against racial discrimination in education. Additionally, the courts
generally tend to sustain, without inquiry as to motive, tax legislation with
a revenue-raising purpose.
n Id. at 9,454 (proposed § 4); 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296, 37,297 (Aug. 22, 1978) (proposed § 3.03).
" 43 Fed. Reg. at 37,298 (proposed § 4.03).
" 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,454 (Feb. 13, 1979) (proposed § 4.03).
41 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
" 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
- 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
" 413 U.S. at 773; 403 U.S. at 612-13.
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Courts have differed, however, whether particular examples of exemp-
tion revocation were sufficiently supported by secular considerations. In
Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States,5 the court held that a
discriminatory private school is not entitled to tax exemption, notwith-
standing the religious belief on which it bases its racially discriminatory
admissions policy. The court stated that there was a legitimate secular
purpose for denying tax-exempt status to schools maintaining a racially
discriminatory admissions policy. The court viewed the general denial of
tax benefits to such schools as neutral since the primary effect would be
to implement the recognized policy against discrimination.
In juxtaposition to the Goldsboro case, Bob Jones University v. United
States'7 held that the revocation by the IRS of the tax-exempt status of a
university practicing racial discrimination was improper. The court con-
cluded that revocation of the benefit conferred on the university through
tax exemption could not be justified by the public's interest in fighting
racial discrimination, finding that the tax benefits involved did not in fact
encourage the university to discriminate against minorities. Commenta-
tors have been critical of this decision, since, in their opinion, it miscon-
strues the rationale of the Green court. In their view, Green did not hold
that the public policy against racial discrimination barred the continuance
of only those government actions which encourage discrimination, but
rather that any form of government aid, even indirect aid to discriminatory
educational institutions, was unacceptable because it would involve gov-
ernmental financial support for illegal activities.
Under the second prong of the three-part test, the denial of tax bene-
fits to schools which practice racial discrimination must be an essentially
neutral act."8 Since the guidelines are not directed at religious schools
alone, the potential results of their implementation must be carefully ex-
amined to determine if their primary effect would be to inhibit the exercise
of religion.
According to the revised Revenue Procedure, the IRS, in its determi-
nation of a "reviewable school," is to consider whether
[tihe school was formed or expanded in accordance with a long-standing
practice of a religion or religious denomination which itself is not racially
discriminatory to provide schools for religious education when circumstances
are present making it practical to do so (such as a sufficient number of
persons of that religious belief in the community to support the school), and
such circumstances are not attributable to a purpose of excluding minori-
ties."8
'5 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977).
4 Id. at 1320.
41 468 F. Supp. 890 (D.S.C. 1978).
" Roehmer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); see notes 42-44 and accompanying
text supra.
,1 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,453 (Feb. 13, 1979) (proposed § 3.03(c)(6)).
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This consideration could be construed to violate the principle of gov-
ernment neutrality in several ways. According to this guideline, the Catho-
lic Church, because of its long history of religious education, could expand
or form schools with less likelihood of being adjudicated racially discrimi-
natory than those of another faith. The IRS has the authority to define a
"long standing practice of religion"50 and can give preference to denomina-
tions which have operated schools in the past over those which seek to
establish them in the future. Stretched to its logical limits, such a consid-
eration oversteps the boundary of government established in United States
v. Ballard,5' where the Supreme Court held that men cannot be required
to prove their religious doctrines or beliefs. As the Court declared, "[t]he
First Amendment does not select any one group or any one type of religion
for preferred treatment. 5 3 Later, in Flowler v. Rhode Island, 5 the Supreme
Court went on to hold that -it was not the business of the courts to deter-
mine whether a religious practice or activity for one group was a first
amendment-protected religion for another.55
In contrast, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has adopted a
practical approach to tax cases, tending not to invalidate legislation under
the "primary effect" test because of possible incidental consequences." For
example, the taxation of newspapers may threaten freedom of the press,
yet it has never been struck down on first amendment grounds. Since the
guidelines are not directed at religious schools alone nor designed to limit
their operation, it would be difficult to assert that the primary effect of the
guidelines would be to inhibit religion.
The third part of the establishment clause test is whether the proposed
regulation fosters excessive government entanglement with religion. Even
though no explicit ruling has been made, dicta in Walz v. Tax
Commission,57 which sustained tax exemption for religious property, im-
plied that taxation of churches or religious organizations might be uncon-
stitutional. In Walz, the Supreme Court noted that the test is really one
of degree, because both taxation and exemption of churches involves some
degree of government involvement with religion." The Court held some
government involvement was inevitable with a tax exemption,, but that
this caused less entanglement than taxation would." Of particular concern
was avoiding substantive governmental evaluation of religious practices
50 Id.
" 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
52 Id. at 86.
" Id. at 87.
345 U.S. 67 (1953).
" Id. at 69-70.
Compare Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250-51 (1936) with Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279-89 (1977).
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
" Id. at 674.
"Id.
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and the entanglement of government and difficult classifications of what
is and is not religious."
The resulting relationship between government and the religious or-
ganization was the essential factor used by the Walz Court in determining
whether the administrative entanglement with religion brought about by
the various courses of action in the taxation area would be excessive. Dan-
ger of excessive entanglement exists if continual government surveillance
becomes necessary to police the program, if the government must become
involved in church decisions, or if annual audits are required." While the
surveillance necessary to enforce the proposed revised Revenue Procedure
would not require continual surveillance or government involvement in
decisions, annual audits might become necessary. In light of Roemer v.
Board of Public Works,"3 however, it is unclear whether annual audits
would be sufficient to invalidate the guidelines. In Roemer, the Supreme
Court approved occasional audits of nonpublic colleges to determine their
use of state aid where the audits were quick and non-judgmental and
similiar to those used for state accreditation.
According to Walz, the establishment clause should protect religious
organizations from active government involvement in religious activity. 3
In sum, however, there appears to be a strong argument to the effect that
the IRS guidelines could withstand an attack on establishment clause
grounds.
Revocation of Tax-Exempt Status and the Free Exercise Clause
In addition to the establishment clause, the first amendment provides
protection for religious schools through the free exercise clause. To sustain
a free exercise argument, it is necessary to show that an enactment has a
coercive effect upon individuals in the practice of their religion.6 When
confronted with the claim that government action infringes an individual's
religious liberty, a court must balance the competing interests of govern-
ment regulation and religious liberty. 5 The government may only regulate
the conduct of its interest is compelling, non-discriminatory, narrowly
related to the public interest, and the least restraint that would serve the
purpose.66
Private religious education has been found to be a protected religious
activity. 7 As a result of religious influence in the teaching of secular sub-
0 Id. at 698 (Harlan, J., concurring).
" See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 694 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part).
82 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
397 U.S. at 672.
Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
' Id. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
'7 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 286 U.S. 510, 535-36 (1925).
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jects, the Supreme Court found it could not approve funding of any in-
struction in private religious schools. Logically, if the education in the
private schools is so religious as to violate the establishment clause when
public funds are granted to the schools, then the religious nature of this
instruction is in turn entitled to the protection guaranteed to religion by
the free exercise clause.
If education is a religious liberty interest, and the IRS guidelines have
a direct or indirect effect upon the religious interest, the balancing test
must be applied: "[O]nly a compelling state interest in the regulation of
a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate can justify
limiting First Amendment freedoms."" The strict restriction on intrusions
was enforced in Thomas v. Collins:6" "[Only the gravest abuses, endan-
gering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation." 7
Finally, Wisconsin v. Yoder" set forth the principle "that only those inter-
ests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."7 Extending the proposed
procedures to their logical limit, they enter this delicate area by attaching
tax consequences to a religious school's ability to admit or deny admit-
tance to any student, as well as the school's ability to hire and fire
teachers based on a particular religious belief. The Supreme Court has
never addressed this question.
The permissibility of the proposed guidelines therefore should not be
blindly taken for granted. Government involvement in church affairs may
rise to the level of entanglement where free exercise would be threatened.
Taxation alone, however, is not sufficient to raise the entanglement ques-
tion. Religious organizations have lost their tax exempt status in the past
for failure to comply with statutory requirements for exempt organiza-
tions,73 and in view of the considerable importance courts are likely to
attach to the compelling state interest in preventing race discrimination,
the Free Exercise argument may not be a strong one.
Freedom of Association
In Green v. Connally, the court specifically addressed whether the
U NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); see Scherbert v. Verner, 379 U.S. 398.(1963).
323 U.S. 516 (1945).
70 Id. at 530.
71 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
n Id. at 215.
11 The Supreme Court, in Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 (1886), upheld a tax
on income-producing church property not occupied by a church building. A circuit court of
appeals, in Parker v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 792 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026
(1967), upheld the withdrawal of the tax-exempt status of a religious organization which had
engaged in blatant profit-making activities. In Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry v. United
States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973), the court subjected a
religious organization to Federal income tax by revoking its tax-exempt status because of
excessive political activities.
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rights of private schools under the first amendment would restrain it from
ordering the IRS to revoke a school's tax-exempt status if it did not satisfy
the standards for disproving a discriminatory policy. Rejecting a freedom
of association claim, the court stated that a right to be free from govern-
ment regimentation, including the right to attend private schools, did not
imply a right to financial support:
[E]xemptions and deductions would be denied not on account of beliefs and
associations but on account of acts and practices constituting discrimination
among students on account of race - acts contrary to a national policy that
has constitutional ingredients.7'
Even statutory classifications which affect a fundamental right are
valid when they are "shown to be necessary to promote a compelling gov-
ernmental interest."75 The compelling and reasonable interest in combat-
ing racial discrimination stands on the highest constitutional ground. The
Green court found the government interest in banning racial discrimina-
tions "dominant over other constitutional interests to the extent that there
is complete and unavoidable conflict."7 The court argued, therefore, that
if a compelling interest exists strong enough to overcome one fundamental
first amendment right, it should also be sufficient to overcome a distinct
but similar right.
THE TWENTY PERCENT STANDARD OF THE IRS PROCEDURE AND THE Bakke
DECISION
The revised Revenue Proceduremay violate the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke," since its guide-
lines may require schools to use race-conscious criteria in determining
admissions policies. In Bakke, the Supreme Court invalidated the minority
quota admissions program at a medical school on the basis of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. A majority of the court disallowed the imposition
of racial goals, or other forms of specific race-conscious relief, unless spe-
cific findings of past discrimination by the courts, Congress, or competent
administrative tribunals existed. 78
The percentage goal mandated by the proposed guidelines can be read
to require that a school enroll a prescribed percentage of minority students
or be found to be presumptively discriminatory. Further, according to the
guidelines, a school will seldom qualify for a tax exemption unless it enrolls
some minority students, no matter how substantial the rebuttal evidence
that it operates on a non-discriminatory basis. Thus, the validity of the
1, 330 F. Supp. at 1166.
71 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
71 330 F. Supp. at 1167. Where there is a compelling government interest, even first amend-
ment freedoms may be limited by appropriately confined lesser measures, although they
could not be prohibited directly. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-90 (1960).
7 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
71 Id. at 307-10.
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numerical standards in the guidelines may depend on whether they are
supported by adequate judicial or administrative findings of discrimina-
tion as required in Bakke.
According to the guidelines, apart from a final court adjudication, two
factors can provide the basis for the revocation of a school's tax-exempt
status. One is a statistical disparity in the racial composition of the school
as compared to the school age population of the community. The other is
the formation or expansion of the schools at the time of public school
desegration in the community. From Bakke, it is unclear whether the
existence of the factual setting described in the guidelines would meet the
test of "findings of identified discrimination" or whether an individualized
agency determination on a school-by-school basis is required before numer-
ical goals become permissible.
In opposition to the guidelines, it can be argued that the Supreme
Court has begun a trend toward stricter standards regarding proof of dis-
criminatory intent and reluctance to use traditional evidentiary presump-
tions like those employed in the proposed guidelines. Thus, in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,7" the Supreme Court held
that while the existence of one-race, or virtually one-race, schools in a
particular school system continues to be constitutionally suspect, the con-
stitutional demand to desegrate schools does not require every school in the
community always to reflect the racial composition of the school system
as a whole. 0 Further, Washington v. Daviss' held that the racial impact of
an act alleged to be racially discriminatory does not per se constitute an
equal protection violation where there was no showing of a racially discrim-
inatory purpose. The Supreme Court also has rejected a desegration plan
for the Dayton, Ohio schools which was based on the district court's finding
that the schools in the district were racially imbalanced. The Court held
that the lack of homogeneity of the pupil population of the Dayton schools
was not of itself a violation of the fourteenth amendment without a show-
ing of intentional segregative actions by the school board.82 Accordingly, a
proven intentional constitutional or statutory violation must be shown
before preferential classification of one race over another can be sustained.
In contrast, disparity between the racial make-up of the school and
the community, taken together with the factor of the school's expansion
during the implementation of desegration, may perhaps be said to provide
sufficient circumstantial evidence of past discriminatory intent to meet
the current constitutional standards. In Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 3 the Supreme Court concluded
that while racial impact does not itself indicate invidious discrimination,
7, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
m Id. at 26.
426 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1976).
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 413-18 (1977).
429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977).
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it may be probative when viewed against the entire sequence of events in
the challenged action. Thus, an inference of discrimination may be sus-
tained where the impact of enrollment decisions by tax exempt private
schools as reflected in their racial student composition occurs contempora-
neously with public school desegration.
An additional consideration centers on the differing role of govern-
ment. Allen Bakke filed suit because he was denied admission to medical
school at the same time minority students with lower academic records
than he had were admitted as a result of the special admissions program.
In the Revenue Procedure, the twenty percent "safe harbor" does not deny
admittance to qualified white students at private schools. Instead, the
twenty percent requirement only sets forth that a particular school will not
be exempt from certain federal taxes unless the twenty percent standard
is satisfied. It can be argued, then, that the Bakke decision is not control-
ling. It is concerned with the situation where government itself attempts
to alleviate the effects of past discrimination by use of a quota-type special
admissions, while the twenty percent standard of the Proposed Procedure
uses numerical standards not to determine who will be admitted to an
educational institution, but rather whether that education shall be tax-
exempt.
The Irrebutable Presumption Doctrine
Constitutional issues also arise from the Procedure's use of evidentiary
presumptions of discrimination. Although there undeniably exists a long-
standing policy permitting the use of presumptions in the discrimination
cases, the Procedure presents the difficult situation where use of such a
presumption impacts upon the right of religious liberty.
A most significant case holding a private school with tax exempt sta-
tus to be racially discriminatory is Norwood v. Harrison." In determining
the eligibility of seven individual schools to receive aid under a state text-
book program to private schools, the court noted that it was well settled
in racial desegregation cases that the parties alleging discrimination need
only make a prima facie case,8" after which "the burden shifts to the
school's officials or representatives to rebut an inference of racial dispar-
ity." This view is supported by Hodgson v. First Federal Savings and
Loan Association:87
In discrimination cases the law with respect to burden of proof is well
settled. The plaintiff is required only to make out a prima facie case of
unlawful discrimination at which point the burden shifts to the defendant
to justify the existence of any disparities.u
" 382 F. Supp. 921 (N.D. Miss. 1974), on remand from 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
" 382 F. Supp. at 924.
11 Id. at 925.
'7 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).
" Id. at 822.
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Norwood went further to define specific facts which would be suffi-
cient to constitute a prima facie case of racial discrimination:
(a) that the school's existence began close upon the heels of the massive
desegregation of public schools within its locale, and (b) that no blacks are
or have been in attendance as students and none is or ever has been employed
as a teacher or administrator at the private school.""
In addition, Brumfield v. Dodd'" provides support for the concept of
shifting the burden of proof as found in the Revised Procedure. In
Brumfield, a U.S. district court in Louisiana held seventy private schools
in that state racially discriminatory in spite of the state certification pro-
cess, and thus ineligible for state textbook assistance. The Brumfield court
relied extensively on the Norwood decision.
While the Proposed Procedure parallels Norwood's focus on schools
formed at or about the time of racial desegration, it also covers schools
substantially expanded at the time of the desegregation, an area not in-
cluded in Norwood's general statement of a prima facie case. Although
none of the private schools in either case involved substantial expansion,
however, the Norwood and Brumfield courts made clear that a substantial
expansion was equally suspect." The second difference between the
Norwood court and the Proposed Procedure is the court's requirement that
there be a total absence of minority students or facility for the inference
to attach. Thus, in this instance, the IRS has gone beyond the criteria with
clear support in the relevant judicial decisions.
The Revised Procedure is in accord with the Norwood court in apply-
ing a flexible standard and objective indices of non-discrimination in re-
butting a prima facie case of discrimination. For each of the seven private
schools in question, the Norwood court required varying amounts of refuta-
tion specifically corresponding with the force of the original prima facie
case. The Proposed Procedure follows this by requiring that "[tihe level
of actions and programs that are adequate may vary from school to school
and depends on the circumstances of the school.""
The concept of shifting the burden of proof is further substantiated by
the general rule that the burden of proof in tax controversies falls upon
taxpayers and tax-exempt organizations, as for example, when taxpayers
must substantiate deductions which are questioned by the Service. 3 Fur-
ther, a claim of tax-exempt status is not to be granted unless material facts
supporting such status are proven by the entity claiming the status.9
While, in criminal tax cases, the burden is on the Government to prove the
criminal tax offense beyond a reasonable doubt, in civil litigation the de-
" 382 F. Supp. at 924-25.
" 425 F. Supp. 528 (E.D. La. 1976).
" Id. at 533; 382 F. Supp. at 926, 931.
" 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,454 (Aug. 13, 1979)(proposed § 4.03).
" Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289-90 (1929).
" Duffy v. Birmingham, 190 F.2d 738, 740 (8th Cir. 1951).
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termination of the IRS is presumed to be correct and the taxpayer must
meet the burden of overcoming that presumption.
Opponents have argued that the Revenue Procedure has established
fixed standards against which certain private schools are always to be
scrutinized. These standards are unalterable even though private schools
which lose their tax-exempt status when judged against those standards
have the opportunity to litigate the Service's determination. Thus, even
though procedural due process requirements are met by providing ade-
quate appeal rights, the procedures, if they establish an irrebutable pre-
sumption against certain schools, may still not satisfy the requirements of
the due process clause.
This same type of objection to an irrebuttable presumption was up-
held in Heiner v. Donnan, 11 where the Supreme Court overturned a federal
estate tax statute, which made a conclusive presumption that gifts made
within two years prior to the donor's death were made in contemplation of
death, thus requiring payment of a higher estate tax. The Court held this
irrebuttable presumption so arbitrary it deprived a taxpayer of property
without due process of law." An irrebuttable presumption was also suc-
cessfully challenged in Stanley v. Illinois, 97 where a statutory presumption
that all unmarried fathers were not qualified to raise their children was
overturned. Finally, in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur," the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a local board of education's rule
requiring pregnant teachers to take maternity leave without pay before and
after the birth of a child on the-grounds that they were presumed physi-
cally unfit.
Some standards which amount to irrebuttable presumptions, how-
ever, are constitutional. Applying the "rational relationship" test, Sakol
v. Commissioner" upheld section 83 of the Code which sets forth a statu-
tory irrebuttable presumption. The court found that economic standards
in the form of irrebuttable presumptions will be upheld where there is a
rational relationship between the criteria set forth and a legitimate pur-
pose for such standards.'"
This rational relationship test, though, should not be applied in cases
involving fundamental rights, because the inquiry here is whether the
presumption established by a particular standard is universally true in fact
and whether a reasonable alternative means exists to make the critical
determination.10 Since private schools are both secular and religious, the
first amendment fundamental right of the free exercise of religion is in-
volved. Thus, if an irrebuttable presumption is involved in the Revenue
"3 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
" Id. at 325.
17 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972).
414 U.S. 632, 643-48 (1974).
574 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 828 (1979).
574 F.2d at 698.
"0 Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
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Procedures, then a two-pronged test must be applied. For private secular
schools the proper test is the "rational relationship" test and for private
religious schools it is the "universally true" test. In the Revenue Procedure,
the Internal Revenue Service has not made such a distinction.
CONGRESSIONALLY PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED IRS REVENUE
PROCEDURE
The materials which have been introduced into the Ninety-sixth Con-
gress regarding the Proposed Revenue Procedure fall into three categories:
1. Resolutions expressing the sense of Congress.
2. Bills to prohibit the final issuance of the proposed revenue procedures.
3. Bills to amend section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
Concurrent Resolutions expressing the sense of the Congress have
been introduced by Congressmen Guyer,' Satterfield,1°3 and Evans.1'0
The resolutions of Congressmen Guyer and Satterfield advocate that
the Revenue Procedure not be adopted since the purpose of tax legislation
and regulation is to raise revenue, not to coerce certain classes of individu-
als toward government ends. According to the resolutions, to do so would
violate freedom of choice for private groups and individuals since no ra-
tional nexus exists between the IRS function to collect taxes and the proce-
dures.
Congressman Evans would seek to express the sense of Congress that
the proposed procedures should not be adopted since they are an usurpa-
tion of Congressional authority. According to this resolution, Congress is
the only constitutionally mandated authority to deal in this area and it has
already expressed itself by exempting from taxation certain organizations
operating exclusively for education purposes.
Bills to prohibit final issuance of the revenue procedures have been
introduced by Congressmen McDonald,' Evans, 06 Quillen,'"' St. Ger-
main,'08 Crane,00 Hammerschmidt,"0 and Dickinson."' The bills of Con-
gressmen McDonald, Evans, Quillen, and St. Germain would prohibit the
Secretary of the Treasury from issuing, in final or proposed form, the
proposed guidelines, or issuing any regulation, revenue procedure, revenue
ruling, or other guidelines setting forth rules similar to the proposed guide-
lines.
102 H.R. Con. Res. 11, 96th Cong., lst Seas. (1979).
103 H.R. Con. Res. 39, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
1*4 H.R. Con. Res. 9, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
"I H.R. 559, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. (1979).
H.R. 1009, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
H.R. 1719, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
" H.R. 1736, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
'" H.R. 214, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. (1979).
"'0 H.R. 1670, 96th Cong., 1st Ses. (1979).
I H.R. 263, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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If these bills are enacted, a conflict would occur when the suits which
are currently pending against the IRS are decided. Pursuant to the Green
case, these suits will most likely compel the IRS to take actions to enforce
the non-discrimination rule applicable to private schools. The bills would
not effect Revenue Procedure 75-50 which established criteria by which a
school is granted or denied tax-exempt status.
The bills introduced by Congressmen Crane, Hammerschmidt, and
Dickinson, like the other bills, would prohibit the Secretary of the Treas-
ury from issuing the proposed Revenue Procedure or similar measures in
final form. The distinction is that these bills would be for a limited period
of time, until December 31, 1980. The reason for the limited period of
effectiveness is to give Congress the time to consider whether it wishes to
review in depth the tax status of private schools.
The effect of these bills would be the same for those previously dis-
cussed except that the likelihood of a judicial-congressional conflict would
be reduced since the proscription against IRS publication of the Revenue
Procedure would lapse prior to the final implementation of any judicial
orders in the pending suits against the IRS.
Bills to amend Section 501 of the IRS Code have been introduced by
Congressmen Dornan"2 and Chappell."3
House Resolution 1002,1" introduced by Congressman Dornan, would
amend Section 501(c)(3) of the IRS Code to legislatively provide that an
exemption from taxation and a deduction for contributions made to organ-
izations would not be construed as a provision of federal financial assis-
tance. The intent of the bill is to remove the granting of tax exemptions
and deductions from consideration as an offense to federal public policy.
This bill would conflict with Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which sets forth a federal public policy against support for racial
segregation in private or public schools:
No person in the United States shall on the grounds of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."'
Again, this bill conflicts with Green v. Connally, "I which held that tax
exemptions and deductions to educational institutions were forms of fed-
eral benefits or indirect aid. The court stated that such aid is barred by
section 601 of the Civil Rights Act and implied that it may also offend the
Constitution.
If the granting of such aid is unconstitutional, merely amending the
IRS Code would not be sufficient to relinquish the requirement of the
' H.R. 1002, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
H.R. 96, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
1,4 H.R. 1002, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
' Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
'" 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
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revocation of tax exemption and deductions to discriminatory schools. If,
in the suits pending against the IRS, the courts hold, on a constitutional
basis, that exemptions and deductions for contributions constitute imper-
missible federal financial aid to discriminatory schools, the IRS may still
be compelled to deny such exemptions and deductions. If the courts con-
sider the issue to be a question of fact rather than law, the legislation would
be outside the legislative authority of Congresss. House Resolution 1002
would apply the amendment retroactively to all organizations under sec-
tion 501(c), not just educational institutions.
Finally, the bill introduced by Congressman Chappell would amend
section 501(c) (3) of the IRS Code to prohibit the IRS from terminating the
exempt status of any institution organized for educational purposes solely
because such school has a racially discriminatory policy unless the school
has been adjudicated racially discriminatory in a federal or state court.
Following the passage of this bill, the IRS could no longer terminate a
school's tax-exempt status on the grounds of racial discrimination until a
party with standing raised and litigated successfully whether a school was
racially discriminatory. By means of this procedure, the burden of proof
would shift from the educational institution to the plaintiff in an adversary
proceeding which involved a justiciable controversy.
Parties with standing in a suit charging racial discrimination would
include a student denied admission, the parents of such a student, and
taxpayers in the community where the school is located. Since the statute
requires the IRS to grant exemption to discriminatory schools if they other-
wise qualify, the IRS would not be a party-in-interest for standing pur-
poses.
In Green, the court held that the Internal Revenue Code required the
"denial of tax exempt status and deductibility of contributions to private
schools practicing racial discrimination."" 7 If this ruling involved a consti-
tutional issue, the proposed amendment to the Internal Revenue Code
would not be allowed. If, however, it was not a constitutionally-based
issue, then the proposed amendment to the Code can stand. The Green
court implied constitutional underpinnings were involved in its decision,
but it was not explicitly stated.
In effect, then, the bill would require the IRS to continue the tax-
exempt status of a school until an adjudication would be reached in a
subsequent or non-administrative forum. However, the bill would not ban
the IRS from denying an application for exemption to a racially discrimi-
natory private school not already exempt.
Certainly Congressman Chappell's H.R. 96 is the most popular of the
many bills which have been introduced. To date, it has been co-sponsored
by eighty-six Congressmen from thirty-three states. In support of his bill,
Mr. Chappell has asserted that it would focus on the schools which have
given a probable cause to suspect discrimination rather than place a blan-
117 330 F. Supp. at 1176.
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ket accusation on all schools founded or expanded during a particular
period of time. Further, in a courtroom adjudication, an accurate descrip-
tion of the facts could be more easily attained than in an agency proceed-
ing." 8 The Chappell bill thus strives to balance a concern for the policy
considerations expressed in Green v. Connally and a need for fairness
towards all educational institutions falling within the ambit of the Reve-
nue Procedure.
CONCLUSION
Since 1971, the Internal Revenue Service has been under an injunction
to insure that tax-exempt status is not accorded to racially discriminatory
private schools." 9 Implementation of the mandate has become the most
controversial endeavor the Service has ever undertaken. The greatest diffi-
culty has arisen from the Service's impatience with the courts' adjudica-
tions of racial discrimination in the schools. Instead of relying upon judi-
cial procedure it has proposed standards which would shift the burden of
proof to the schools to prove administratively that they are not racially
discriminatory.
Such regulation of private religious schools brings to the forefront
difficult first amendment problems. While Green v. Connally2 held that
the fundamental right to attend a private school did not imply a right to
financial support, it did not rule whether tax exemption was a method of
support. While Goldsboro' stated that there is a legitimate secular pur-
pose for denying tax exemption, Bob Jones122 held that first amendment
rights are stronger than the government's compelling interest to penalize
discrimination. As a result, the judicial basis for the removal of tax-exempt
status from discriminatory religious schools has not been firmly estab-
lished.
Furthermore, another area of concern is the injury which the IRS
could do to private religious education if the procedures it has proposed
were used improvidently. While the argument can be made that the courts
are available for redress, this is costly and time consuming and in many
instances would mean the elimination of the school involved.
Certainly the concept behind the proposed guidelines is mandated by
judicial action. If its application approaches government interference with
first amendment-protected areas, however, then this whole area of the law
should be re-examined with a view towards proper balancing of fundamen-
tal religious rights against the traditional policy against discrimination.
"I Statement of Congressman William Chappell, Jr., before the Oversight Subcommittee of
the House Ways and Means Committee (Feb. 28, 1979).
"I Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1179-80 (D.D.C.), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Coit
v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
' 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
" Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977).
in Bob Jones University v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890 (D.S.C. 1978).
